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RESPONSE
Separation of Powers Versus Checks
and Balances in the Criminal Justice
System: A Response to Professor Epps
Carissa Byrne Hessick *
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II. SEPARATING POWER AND PROTECTING LIBERTY ....................... 169
III. DIFFUSING POWER WITHIN BRANCHES .................................... 179
Separating powers between the three different branches of
government serves an important role in the criminal justice system: It
helps to protect individual liberty. Separation of powers provides that
protection because it requires multiple and diverse actors to agree that
a person should be punished before that person can be convicted of a
crime. First, the legislature has to decide to criminalize particular
conduct. 1 Second, the executive must decide to prosecute a particular
individual. Third, the judge must decide whether the defendant’s
conduct falls within the scope of the criminal statute and the jury must
decide factual guilt. Finally, the executive has the power of clemency—
the power to wipe out convictions with a pardon or reduce punishment
with commutation. 2
If any of these actors believe that the specific behavior should
not be criminalized or that the particular defendant should not be
*Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland “Buck” Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law
and Director of the Prosecutors and Politics Project, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1.
The legislature must also either convince the executive to sign legislation or overcome a
veto. Because this is arguably a “check” on the legislature’s power to make laws, I have omitted it
from the separation of powers analysis on the theory that Professor Epps would not include it in
his definition of “separation of powers.” See Daniel Epps, Checks and Balances in the Criminal
Law, 74 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13–14.
2.
One might argue that the executive’s clemency powers are a “check” on the judiciary’s
decision to convict and impose sentence. On the other hand, clemency has long been viewed as an
executive prerogative. I do not have a firm view on the matter, and in any event, it is not important
to my overall point to resolve that question.
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punished, then the defendant will not be convicted. In other words, we
give each of these institutions a “veto” over the decision to punish.
Distributing the veto power across institutions thus protects liberty by
making it difficult to impose punishment.
Why is it so important to protect liberty when it comes to
criminal punishment? One reason might be because we do not trust
government with the awesome power of criminal prosecution. After all,
the whole point of a criminal prosecution is to punish a person, often
through a deprivation of liberty—a term of imprisonment, or sometimes
a sentence of death. Even the threat of punishment is a limit on liberty
because it prohibits people from engaging in certain conduct. And the
threat to liberty from criminal laws is greater than the threat from civil
laws and administrative regulations because “the executive has the
exclusive power to enforce criminal laws in the federal system.” 3
But there is another, in my mind, more important reason:
ordinary political forces and human passions often favor punishment. 4
We are quick to condemn people when they have done something wrong.
And the desire to “make someone pay” when others are hurt can
overcome concerns about fairness or mercy. 5 In other words, we need
structural protections, like the separation of powers, which we adopt at
moments of reflection, in order to counterbalance our desire to punish
in the heat of the moment.
In his thought-provoking article, Professor Dan Epps pushes
back against this (admittedly) conventional view of the separation of
powers in the criminal justice system. 6 Drawing on insights from other
fields, such as administrative law and constitutional law, Epps argues
that separating powers between the three branches of government is
insufficient, if not unnecessary, to protect liberty and other important
values. Instead of focusing so much on separating powers, Epps argues,
the criminal justice system should adopt more checks and balances—an
idea that he tells us is related to, but distinct from, the mere separation
of powers.
According to Epps, the separation of powers is about diffusing
functional power between the three branches of government—the
3.
See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107
VA. L. REV. 281, 307 (2021) (cataloguing the reasons that criminal laws pose a greater risk to
liberty than noncriminal laws).
4.
See generally RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
5.
For example, people’s desire for harsh punishment can overcome their sense of fairness,
especially when they do not deliberate. See, e.g., Daniel A. Yudkin et al., Reflexive Intergroup Bias
in Third-Party Punishment, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. GEN. 1448 (2016) (observing this
phenomenon in the context of a study of in-groups and out-groups).
6.
Epps, supra note 1, at 14.

2021]

VANDERBILT L. REV. EN BANC

161

legislature has the legislative power, the executive has the executive
power, and courts have the judicial power. While each of these branches
plays a role in the conviction and punishment of an individual, the roles
they play are different and separate based on their functions. 7 In
contrast, Epps defines checks and balances as those structural features
that ensure overlapping jurisdiction by different social and political
interests over the same decision. That overlap can occur across
branches—such as when the President can veto legislation passed by
Congress—within a single branch—such as when one executive official
can overrule another—or even outside of the government all together—
such as when reporters provide transparency for and criticism of
government actions. 8
There are many things about which Professor Epps and I agree.
We agree that the phrase “separation of powers” is sometimes used to
convey different ideas, and we agree that it is worth being precise about
which meaning is intended in order to have a more substantive and
informed conversation. 9 We also agree that strictly separating the
functions between different branches does not necessarily lead to a
more robust system of checks and balances. 10 Perhaps most
importantly, we agree that the modern criminal justice system does a
poor job of protecting individual liberty. 11
But there are also a number of important issues on which we do
not agree. 12 Professor Epps and I do not agree about what fundamental
purpose structural protections are supposed to serve in the criminal
justice system. We do not agree on whether more attention to the
separation of powers, standing alone, would significantly improve the
7.
Id. at 11–14, 26–28.
8.
Id. at 26–28.
9.
Compare Epps, supra note 1, at 8 (noting “that ‘separation of powers’ is often used to refer
to distinct, perhaps conflicting, concepts” including the idea of “separating government power
among distinct, functionally differentiated political institutions” and “an idea that is better labeled
‘checks and balances’—the diffusion of government power between different interests or
institutions that check the others”), with Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law
Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 1006–07 (2019) (“The phrase ‘separation of powers’ is often used to
refer to two related but distinct ideas about the allocation of power in American government . . .
the fact that the text of the Constitution assigns different powers to different branches of
government [and] . . . the idea that the different branches of government serve to check and
balance one another.”).
10. Compare Epps, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining how separation of powers is sometimes
used as “a justification for courts’ refusal to limit criminal punishment or to provide rights for
defendants when doing so would require the court to intrude on the functions assigned to other
branches”), with Hessick, supra note 9, at 1015 (stating that “even though common law crimes
allow judges to perform more than one function, that does not mean they provide fewer checks and
balances than” a system in which the legislature is solely responsible for recognizing new crimes).
11. Compare Epps, supra note 1, at 44, with Hessick, supra note 9, at 1015–17.
12. As is the convention when academics discuss each other’s work, I will focus on those
disagreements far more than the points on which we agree.
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criminal justice system’s protection of liberty. We do not agree on
whether reforms that separate functions within an institution or a
branch of government will provide a similar level of protection to liberty
as separating functions between different branches. And, underlying
some of these other disagreements, is a failure to agree about the
precise nature of the powers that are (or at least were) distributed
across the three branches.
I. STRUCTURAL CHECKS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
One of Professor Epps’s great contributions in this article is to
summarize several decades worth of non-criminal law scholarship on
the separation of powers and checks and balances. 13 Those of us who
write in criminal law often do not take the time to keep abreast of
scholarship in other fields. Perhaps that is why, as Professor Epps
notes, those criminal law scholars who write about the separation of
powers have continued to embrace the idea that functional separation
will protect liberty, while scholars in other fields have largely
abandoned that idea. Instead, as Epps notes, the scholars in other fields
offer more nuanced and complex ideas about government design—ideas
that use structural features other than the separation of powers to
ensure that various interests are represented in government
decisionmaking.
As a criminal law scholar who was not familiar with the
administrative law and constitutional law literature that Professor
Epps summarizes, I found myself interested and informed by the work
of these non-criminal law scholars. But as I read the summary of their
work, it became clear why that work has not gained much ground
within the criminal law community. It is not merely that specialization
leads us to ignore work outside of the criminal law field, but rather that
there is an important difference between government action in criminal
law and in other fields.
In criminal law, “successful” government action always results
in punishment, while in other fields it can result in a range of outcomes.
Social welfare spending, the development of environmental standards,
and countless other government actions can be framed as infringements
on liberty—people have to pay taxes and companies must stop
polluting, etc. 14 But those non-criminal government actions are also
13. Epps, supra note 1, at 25–39.
14. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169–71 (1974) (comparing
income taxes to “forced labor” because they represent an unjust theft by the state of an individual’s
property); Arthur J. Cockfield & Jonah Mayles, The Influence of Historical Tax Law Developments
on Anglo-American Laws and Politics, 5 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 40, 65 n.207 (2013) (acknowledging that
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easily understood as tradeoffs in which the welfare and liberty of the
many are secured with minimal inconvenience to others. 15
Criminal prosecutions cannot be framed the same way. A
successful prosecution ends in conviction and some form of punishment.
The conviction and punishment do not provide an immediate tangible
benefit, even to the individual victim that the defendant harmed. 16
Instead, the defendant is deprived of liberty as a form of punishment or
in the hope that there will be some future benefit from the
punishment—namely the reduction of future crime through deterrence,
rehabilitation, or incapacitation. 17
This fundamental difference—that criminal prosecutions are
always about the deprivation of liberty—means that the conversation
about institutional structure will always look different in the criminal
justice system than elsewhere. We may, for example, want to prioritize
efficiency when it comes to non-criminal law structures, such as the
structures surrounding environmental regulations, because those
regulations quite clearly protect the welfare of many and their liberty
impact is minimal. But liberty is never a minimal concern in the
criminal justice system. 18
In addition to the liberty concerns, criminal law is also different
because human passion and ordinary politics almost always favor more
punishment. 19 Powerful political interests will often line up on both
sides of non-criminal law issues, such as social welfare spending and
taxes “arguably inhibit liberty by constraining an individual’s choice to pursue productive
activities”).
15. Cockfield & Mayles, supra note 14, at 65 n.207 (discussing “the complex interaction
between tax laws and individual liberty: even good taxes arguably inhibit liberty by constraining
an individual’s choice to pursue productive activities, yet tax laws raise revenues that, within
democracies, promote liberty by expanding choices and opportunities for other individuals”).
16. Discussions about the purposes of punishment sometimes talk about the convictions as
affirming the moral worth of the crime victim, see, for example, Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms
Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992), but aside from
quasi-criminal remedies, such as restitution, the criminal process is simply not designed to restore
the victim to her pre-crime state. Indeed, it is this perceived shortcoming of the criminal justice
system that has led some to champion restorative justice measures as an alternative to the
traditional system of convictions and punishment. See, e.g., LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES:
VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 25, 55–56 (1996) (describing the traditional criminal
justice system as ignoring the needs of victims and treating them as no more than an “evidentiary
tool”).
17. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 79–105 (8th ed.
2007) (compiling materials addressing the various purposes punishment is thought to serve).
18. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 3, at 307–08 (explaining why the “threat from
combining legislative and executive powers is more pronounced in criminal cases than in civil
cases”).
19. See BARKOW, supra note 4, at 105–24 (describing the “populist politics” of punishment);
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE
REAL REFORM 161–83 (2017) (describing the “broken politics of punishment”).
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environmental regulations. But that is almost never true in the
criminal justice system. 20 As a result, legislation creating new crimes
or lengthening sentences has continued to pass even as partisan
gridlock has made other types of legislation more difficult. 21
In short, while it is bit of a cliché for scholars to say that their
field is different—such claims are often derided as “exceptionalism” 22—
for criminal law generally, and for structural protections within
criminal law more specifically, the exceptionalism claim appears to be
true. In addition to the arguments I have offered above, the courts have
repeatedly crafted special doctrines just for criminal law on the theory
that criminal laws are different. 23
This criminal law exceptionalism matters because it suggests
that the lessons from outside of criminal law should not simply be
accepted or adopted full cloth. It also suggests that some of Professor
Epps’s arguments—arguments that rely on non-criminal law
scholarship about the separation of powers—may not be as persuasive
in the criminal law context.
Take, for example, his argument about the Special Counsel
investigation by Robert Mueller into President Donald Trump. 24 He
offers the Special Counsel investigation as an example of how the
functional separation of powers may be less effective at preventing
tyranny than checks and balances within a particular branch. Epps
notes that the story of the Special Counsel investigation—that the
investigation was permitted to conclude even though President Trump
obviously wanted to fire Mueller—was “not obviously a story about the

20. As Bill Stuntz explained:
In other fields, legislation is about tradeoffs and compromises. When writing and enacting criminal
prohibitions, legislators usually ignore tradeoffs and rarely need to compromise. Save for law
enforcement lobbies, few organized, well-funded interest groups take an interest in criminal
statutes; criminal defendants’ interests nearly always go unrepresented in legislative always.
Legislators thus have little reason to focus carefully on the consequences of the prohibitions they
write.
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 173 (2011); see also Rachel E.
Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neil, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing
Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1980 (2006) (explaining that, with
the exception of those who care about white collar crime, “the groups that seek shorter sentences
and more flexible sentencing authority do not wield much political power”).
21. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 3, at 327 (documenting that “[l]egislatures generally,
and Congress in particular, have proven to be remarkably proficient and efficient in the enactment
of criminal laws”).
22. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE
L. J. ONLINE 149, 149 (2016) (criticizing “administrative law exceptionalism” and defining the term
as “the misperception that a particular regulatory field is so different from the rest of the
regulatory state that general administrative law principles do not apply”).
23. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 3, at 300–05 (describing these doctrines in detail).
24. Epps, supra note 1, at 41–43.
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success of the Madisonian design per se.” 25 Perhaps the support of
Senate Republicans for the investigation kept Trump from firing
Mueller. 26 Perhaps it was a triumph of de facto political constraints
rather than formal legal constraints. 27 Or perhaps the Special Counsel
story should be seen as a triumph of the diffusion of power within the
executive—after all, Mueller was only appointed because Trump’s own
political appointee within the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, decided that such an appointment
was necessary. 28
I don’t have a considered opinion on how we ought to view the
fact that President Trump did not fire Robert Mueller. But I do have an
opinion on the relevance of the Mueller investigation on the question of
separation of powers and the criminal justice system—namely, that the
continuation of a criminal investigation against the wishes of the
elected official who is theoretically responsible for that investigation is
not an example of the separation of powers succeeding in the protection
of liberty. If anything, it shows how diffusing power within a branch of
government can prevent that branch from acting as a veto on the
decision to punish. The head of the executive branch, the President, did
not wish to investigate or prosecute certain individuals, and it is only
because the executive branch has adopted regulations that can help to
shield certain investigations from political pressure that the
prosecutions proceeded. Indeed, once Robert Mueller concluded his
investigation, President Trump used his clemency powers to nullify
most of those prosecutions, and in so doing to criticize and attempt to
discredit the entire investigation. 29
Many people probably disagree with President Donald Trump’s
view of the Russia investigation. Personally, I was deeply concerned by
the allegations of Russian interference and obstruction of justice that
Robert Mueller investigated. And I was appalled by the Justice
Department’s decisions to intervene in the cases of Michael Flynn and
Roger Stone after the Mueller investigation was concluded and before
they were pardoned. 30 But the fact that I think those particular
25. Id. at 42.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 43.
28. Id.
29. See Amber Phillips, Trump’s Pardon of Paul Manafort Brings Full Circle the
POST
(Dec.
24,
2020),
Undermining
of
the
Russia
Investigation,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/24/trumps-pardon-paul-manafort-brings-fullcircle-undermining-russia-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/H4QT-JGSQ].
30. Carissa Byrne Hessick, What the Judge Overseeing Michael Flynn’s Case Can Do Now,
SLATE (May 15, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/05/michael-flynn-plea-judgespecial-treatment.html [https://perma.cc/3JXR-E5YV] (“The Justice Department should not have

166

VANDERBILT L. REV. EN BANC

[Vol. 74:159

individuals received unduly lenient treatment—treatment that the
DOJ has not afforded to other similarly situated defendants who are
not political allies of President Trump—does not change the fact that
the Special Counsel prosecution arguably evaded a veto gate. In other
words, whatever the Mueller investigation may tell us about our
political system, it does not show that diffusion of power will protect
individual liberty unless the diffusion is styled as the power to veto,
rather than the power to overturn a veto.
To be fair to Epps, he offers the Special Counsel investigation as
an example of avoiding tyranny, not protecting liberty. 31 To the extent
that he is referring to tyranny simply as the concentration of power in
the hands of one individual, then any diffusion of power within the
executive branch will, by definition, avoid tyranny. But I do not think
that the mere concentration of power is what is meant by the term
“tyranny” when it is used in connection with the criminal justice
system. 32 If it were, then presidential pardons are, by definition, a form
of tyranny. And I simply cannot imagine that most people would use
the word “tyranny” to refer to an act of leniency or mercy.
Instead, I think tyranny is used in the context of criminal law as
a shorthand for the idea of the concentration of the power to inflict
punishment into the hands of a single individual. 33 Actually, to be quite
truthful, the term is probably used more as a rhetorical device than a
precise argument about government structure. In any event, the very
idea of veto gates relies on the idea that the decision of one institution—
or even one individual—not to punish is able to override the desire of
others to punish.
The Special Counsel investigation example exposes a disconnect
between Epps’s discussion of separation of powers and my own view.
Because he is drawing on the non-criminal law literature, he is juggling
one set of procedures for friends and allies of the president and another set of procedures for
everyone else. That’s not justice—it’s injustice.”).
31. Epps introduces the discussion of the Mueller investigation with a discussion of whether
the functional separation of powers is effective “as a tyranny-limiting mechanism,” Epps, supra
note 1, at 43, and he notes that the Russia investigation “may provide an example of how ‘de facto
constraints arising from politics’ can prevent tyranny more effectively than formal legal
constraints on power.” Id. at 42–43.
32. Epps sort of hints at this when he characterizes tyrannical governments as “united by the
absence of meaningful checks, formal or informal, on state power more generally and on the power
to punish in particular.” Id. at 33.
33. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1012–14 (2006) (discussing the Framers’ concern with “tyranny” in the criminal justice system
as concern about particular practices—such as bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and the
suspension of habeas corpus—that would have resulted in less liberty and more punishment);
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 3, at 306–07 (discussing Madison’s reference to tyranny in
Federalist 47 in the context of explaining how delegation of criminal lawmaking threatens
individual liberty).
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several reasons other than the protection of liberty that people have
given in favor of separating powers—protecting against tyranny,
limiting agency costs, preserving the rule of law, ensuring
specialization and efficiency, and producing better policy. 34 As a result,
some of the arguments in his article were directed at those other, nonliberty reasons.
But those non-liberty reasons are at best of secondary concern to
the criminal law community. Those of us who have talked about the
need for functional separation of powers in the criminal justice system
have done so by invoking the concept of liberty and veto gates. 35 The
liberty argument is the view that is most clearly articulated in the
criminal law commenters to whom Epps is most visibly responding—
namely Rachel Barkow and Shima Baradaran Baughman. 36 Indeed,
Epps himself acknowledges that the “leading argument” for the
separation of powers is about protecting liberty and avoiding tyranny. 37
If his argument is that criminal law scholars ought to reorient our view
of the separation of powers, then it seems unnecessary for him to
address arguments that criminal law scholars have not made when
discussing the functional separation of powers.
This discussion about which separation of powers arguments
ought to matter obscures perhaps a more important point—that Epps
himself does not appear to buy-in to the negative liberty goal of
separating powers. Obviously, he does not think that the functional
separation of powers is necessary or effective in protecting negative
liberty—a point that I address below. But he also does not appear to
think that the goal of structural protections should be to protect
negative liberty by making it more difficult to convict and punish
people. Instead, he appears to think that structural protections should
make it easier to punish some defendants at least some of the time.
I have used the word “appear,” because I may be
misunderstanding Professor Epps on this point. He often frames his
inquiry as how to best ensure the involvement of different “interests” in
government who represent “competing ideas about criminal justice,” 38
rather than the particular interest of protecting negative liberty. At
times, he talks about wanting to “protect the values we care about” and

34. Epps, supra note 1, at 32–39.
35. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 33, at 1017, 1030–31; Shima Baradaran Baughman,
Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 1077–78, 1083–84 (2017); Hessick, supra
note 9, at 1015–17.
36. Epps, supra note 1, at 22–23.
37. Id. at 32.
38. Id. at 40–41, 43–44, 56, 60–61.
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produce “good results.” 39 I take these statements to suggest that, in his
view, some failures of criminal justice system structures include
decisions to punish too little, rather than too much.
Further evidence that Epps does not think protecting liberty
should be the main goal of separating powers in the criminal justice
system comes from his discussion of functional duplication—a term that
he defines to mean assigning the same function to different
decisionmakers within the system. 40 Professor Epps notes that
functional duplication could cure a rule-of-law deficiency in some
systems—namely the “failure to subject powerful elites to criminal
punishment.” 41 He notes that “a system could be designed to reduce that
failure by giving multiple different decisionmakers, drawn from
different parts of society, the power to decide whether to bring charges,
with a decision by one proving sufficient.” 42 I cannot tell whether Epps
would endorse such a system or not. But this does not seem like the sort
of suggestion that would be offered by a person who thinks structures
ought to exist primarily to protect liberty.
Perhaps the best evidence that Epps does not agree with my
view that structural features of the criminal justice system should
prioritize the protection of negative liberty is his discussion of the media
as an “external check.” He praises media attention as an external check
that can inform “the public about the criminal justice system’s failure
to provide sufficient punishment.” 43 As Epps notes, media coverage of
the criminal justice system is more often aimed at ensuring that there
is more punishment, not less. 44
These passages suggest to me that Epps may be doing more than
simply responding to non-criminal law arguments about the separation
of powers. They suggest that Epps is more interested in structures that
will result in what he perceives of as good outcomes from a social utility
standpoint, rather than structures that protect negative liberty and
may result in the non-prosecution or acquittal of some guilty people.
(Some of his previous scholarship suggests that this may be the view

39. Id. at 46; see also id. at 47 (“Nor has the separation of powers been able to . . . produce
good policy . . . .”); id. at 49 (“Separating political power into discrete functional branches of
government is not, at least standing alone, a particularly reliable strategy for limiting the power
of the state, producing good policy, and protecting liberty.”) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 70.
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id. at 72–73.
43. Id. at 63.
44. “Media attention is not only useful for drawing attention to unjust convictions; it also can
inform (and almost certainly more often does inform) the public about the criminal justice system’s
failure to provide sufficient punishment.” Id.
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that he takes. 45) If Epps does believe structures ought to be calibrated
to produce better outcomes—even when those outcomes result in less
protection of liberty—then not only is the disagreement I have with him
likely intractable, but his argument is unlikely to persuade many others
in the criminal law field who also view the separation of powers
primarily as a way to protect liberty.
II. SEPARATING POWER AND PROTECTING LIBERTY
Whatever his views on the purposes of functional separation of
powers, Professor Epps also roundly rejects the argument that
separating of powers within the criminal justice system does a good job
creating veto gates and protecting liberty. More specifically, while he
acknowledges that distributing power across multiple institutions can
diffuse that power, 46 he does not think that “division into functional
branches makes that diffusion more likely.” 47
He argues that “nothing about functional separation per se”
makes it more likely that “different interests play a role in effecting
government policy.” 48 To the contrary, he argues, because the different
branches are supposed to exercise different functions, they are not in a
position to second-guess the decisions made by the other branches. He
gives the following example:
What if, for example, a legislator passes an oppressive law, and the executive chooses to
bring charges? Even if the judiciary is controlled by interests more sympathetic to the
defendant than the other two branches, the court’s power to act as a meaningful veto is
constrained by the separation of powers. If the defendant’s conduct falls within the
language written by the legislature—and does not otherwise violate a constitutional
prohibition—and so long as the prosecution has not committed such serious misconduct
as to justify dismissal of the charges, the judiciary is powerless to act as a veto. That is
not a side effect of the separation of powers; it is the whole point of the separation of
powers, as each branch is supposed to stay within its own lane and limit itself to its own
function. 49

Epps’s example of the more lenient but powerless judge is not
merely a hypothetical. He also points his readers to a real world
example, Brogan v. United States, 50 in which the Supreme Court
refused to recognize an “exculpatory no” defense to the federal crime of

45. Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(2015) (arguing that modern society should reject the famous “Blackstone principle,” namely
“[b]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”).
46. Epps, supra note 1, at 34.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 37.
49. Id. at 45.
50. Id. at 17, 81 (discussing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1988)).
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making a false statement. 51 The Brogan Court said it did not have the
power to give a statute a more narrow meaning than what is written in
the text. Brogan has the added wrinkle of raising the question of
criminal defenses, and that is the purpose for which Professor Epps
cites it. 52
Epps is certainly correct that the Supreme Court will sometimes
invoke the separation of powers as a reason for it not to intervene on
behalf of criminal defendants. It did so in Brogan, it has done so in other
cases when refusing to construe a statute narrowly. 53 It has also done
so in cases where defendants sought an intervention that would have
encroached on a prosecutor’s charging power. 54 Professor Epps
presumably sees these examples as evidence that the functional
separation of powers does not protect liberty.
But I see those examples differently. Rather than seeing them
as proof that functional separation of powers does not protect liberty, I
see them as failures of the modern Supreme Court’s separation of
powers doctrine—in particular, I see them as examples of the Court’s
ahistorical understanding of what the “judicial power” includes.
Take, for example, Brogan and other cases in which the Supreme
Court has refused to narrowly construe what appears to be an overly
broad statute—that is, a statute that is written more broadly than
whatever problem the legislature was trying to address. The Supreme
Court tells us that it must interpret the statute only according to the
plain meaning of the text in that statute. To do otherwise, the Court
says, would impinge upon Congress’s power to legislate. 55
These sorts of cases ignore the fact that, for centuries, judges
routinely claimed the power to construe penal statutes more narrowly
than they were written. 56 Indeed, the practice dates to common law
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
52. See Epps, supra note 1, at 17.
53. See, e.g., Brogan, 522 U.S. at 405–08; Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993).
54. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (refusing to grant plaintiffs
discovery in their selective prosecution claim because it could interfere with executive decisions
about whether to prosecute, which is a “a core executive constitutional function”).
55. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 405 (“The objectors’ principal grievance on this score, however, lies
not with the hypothetical prosecutors but with Congress itself, which has decreed the obstruction
of a legitimate investigation to be a separate offense, and a serious one. It is not for us to revise
that judgment.”).
56. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (refusing to affirm the conviction of
a fisherman whose actions fell within the plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 1519); State v. Norfolk S. R.R.
Co., 82 S.E. 963, 966 (N.C. 1914) (“It is an ancient, but just and equitable, doctrine which extends
a penal statute beyond its words in favor of a defendant, while holding it tightly to its words against
him.”); State v. Barefoot, 31 S.C.L. 209, 211 (S.C. App. L. 1845) (“The statute, being penal, shall
be construed favorably.”); Reed v. Davis, 25 Mass. 514, 533 (Mass. 1829) (“The statute is highly
penal, and should therefore be limited in its application, to the object the legislature had in view.”);
Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502, 505 (Conn. 1816):
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England. 57 Why should we assume that this practice was not considered
part of the “judicial power” that the Constitution assigns to the courts?
The same may also be true for the modern Supreme Court’s
deference to prosecutorial decision-making. The Court routinely refuses
to subject prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions to judicial
review, 58 a refusal that it sometimes supports by reference to the
separation of powers. 59 But it is far from clear that the modern
deference to prosecutorial discretion is consistent with the historical
understanding of functional separation of powers. In particular, modern
deference may be based on an overly narrow understanding of the
judicial power.
For example, the modern Supreme Court has accepted the
constitutionality of plea bargaining, including the power of prosecutors
to promise leniency to defendants in return for those defendants
cooperating with law enforcement and testifying against their
confederates. 60 But it is far from clear that the historical
understandings of the executive power and the judicial power would
have permitted such practices. Before plea bargaining became
normalized, 61 the Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested that some plea
bargaining practices represented an infringement on the judicial power
by the executive. In particular, it said that a prosecutor promising
leniency in return for defendants testifying against their confederates
was a “usurpation” of judicial authority because only judges have the
power “to countenance the escape of an accomplice from punishment,
for giving evidence against those indicted with him” and “a public

Recourse may, therefore be had to the spirit, or reason, of the law, for the purpose of exempting
from its operation, one, who is within the letter of it; but this, generally speaking, cannot be done
in order to bring within the penalty, one, who is not within the letter. Hence it results, as a general
proposition, to which there have been but very few exceptions, that no man can be subjected to the
penalty of a statute, unless he is within both the letter and spirit of it.
See also F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Constraining Criminal Laws, 106 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2022) (tracing this history).
57. See, e.g., Raynard v. Chase, 97 Eng. Rep. 155, 158 (1756) (Mansfield, C.J.) (concluding
that a defendant should not be punished, even though his actions violated the text of the statute).
58. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
59. See supra note 56.
60. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185–86 (1992) (concluding that courts should
not treat a prosecutor’s power to control whether a defendant receives a shorter sentence for
cooperating with law enforcement “differently from a prosecutor’s other decisions”—namely, that
courts should review prosecutorial decisions not to show leniency only if “the refusal was based on
an unconstitutional motive”).
61. For an excellent account of how plea bargaining was normalized, see William Ortman,
When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2020).
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prosecutor has no authority to make any such agreement with a
defendant.” 62
These historical examples matter because they suggest that the
problem might not be the functional separation of powers insufficiently
protecting liberty, but rather the modern Supreme Court’s mistaken (or
at least ahistorical) understanding of what those powers entail. In
particular, they suggest that the Supreme Court has developed an
overly cramped view of what the “judicial power” is supposed to look
like in criminal cases.
To some extent, I think that Epps may agree with me about how
the legal understanding separation of powers has shifted over time.
Epps focuses on the power of juries—who exercised an important piece
of the “judicial power” assigned to the court in the Constitution. Epps
speaks of the jury and its unanimity requirement as emblematic of his
view of a “check” within government that incorporates many different
and diverse interests. And he notes that, at the Founding, the jury’s
power to nullify was considered important. 63 But modern doctrine
disfavors nullification. 64
But the fact that the jury used to serve the role that Epps praises
is not, in his mind, evidence of the fact that Madisonian separation of
powers can effectively protect liberty. Instead, he views the weakening
of the jury as proof that functional separation of powers does not work
because the jury no longer serves as an appropriately robust check now
that it has been confined merely to fact finding. 65
But I think that Epps’s critique of how the jury power has been
diluted misses the point. The idea of separation of powers is not simply
that some powers should be assigned to different branches. It is that
certain powers should be assigned. For the jury, it was the power not
only to find facts, but also to shape the content of the criminal law
through the power to nullify. 66 Just as with judges, the powers of the
jury have been inappropriately narrowed over time.

62. Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 350 (1877).
63. Epps, supra note 1, at 67–69.
64. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101–02 (1895) (affirming a conviction of a
defendant whose attorney was not permitted to inform the jury of their power to nullify on the
theory that “it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that
law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence”).
65. Epps, supra note 1, at 56–57; 60–61.
66. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1415–18 (2017) (discussing the centrality of the jury in early
America, including the jury’s ability “to both create and control the content of the colony’s
substantive law”); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 50–61 (2003) (explaining how the
jury’s power to nullify served “as a potent check on the legislature”).
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Indeed, Brogan v. United States 67—the very case that Epps cites
for the proposition that judges are powerless in the face of a punitive
law and an aggressive prosecutor—contains evidence that even the
modern Supreme Court does not view judges as powerless to constrain
the decisions made by legislatures and prosecutors. The Brogan Court
refused to intervene in the prosecution of what reasonable people could
believe is an unjust prosecution, but at the same time it affirmed a
continuing role for Article III courts in narrowing criminal law through
their judicial power.
The Brogan Court acknowledged two separate examples of this
continuing role. First, the Brogan majority admitted that the Supreme
Court will sometimes interpret statutes more narrowly than written—
such as when a statute does not contain a mens rea requirement, the
Court will sometimes read one in. 68 When the Court insists on reading
a mens rea requirement into a criminal statute, it is not merely
determining whether a “defendant’s conduct falls within the language
written by the legislature—and does not otherwise violate a
constitutional prohibition.” 69 Instead, it is making a value judgement
that defendants should not be convicted under certain circumstances.
In other words, the Court is vetoing the decision of prosecutors (and
perhaps the legislature) that a culpable mental state is not necessary
to punish.
Second, the Brogan majority also conceded that courts recognize
affirmative defenses without any existing statutory authority. 70 Indeed,
the Brogan Court did not merely concede that courts may recognize
defenses in the absence of statutes—it actually did so itself. The
majority opinion says that the dissent is correct to state “that the
present statute does not ‘mak[e] it a crime for an undercover narcotics
agent to make a false statement to a drug peddler’” because “[c]riminal
prohibitions do not generally apply to reasonable enforcement actions
by officers of the law.” 71 But the majority does not cite a federal statute
67. Id. at 17, 81 (discussing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1988)).
68. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 406 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994)); see
also Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97 WASH. U.
L. REV. 351, 401–06 (2019) (describing how the Supreme Court has come “tantalizingly close to
adopting a clear statement rule” for mens rea in criminal statutes).
69. Epps, supra note 1, at 45.
70. In particular, the Brogan Court cites Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), for
the proposition that courts may construe a statute “not to cover violations produced by
entrapment.” Brogan, 522 U.S. at 406. The Sorrells Court addressed head on the question whether
it could and should recognize the entrapment defense to a federal statute even though there was
no federal statute creating such a defense. 287 U.S. 435, 443–452. Questions about the proper role
of courts versus legislatures were raised in that case, and yet the Court nonetheless affirmed the
judicial power to recognize non-statutory defenses.
71. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 406 (1998).
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for that proposition—indeed because there does not appear to be such a
statute. 72 It instead cites a treatise for the idea that “[e]very American
jurisdiction recognizes some form of law enforcement authority
justification.” 73
Just as with the practice of reading mens rea limitations into a
statute, creating new affirmative defenses shows that courts are not, as
Professor Epps tells us, “powerless to act as a veto.” They can—and do—
use the judicial power to veto decisions by legislatures and prosecutors.
To be clear, the courts do not use this power often enough. 74 The
abandonment of the rule of strict construction for penal statutes and
the watering down of the rule of lenity are both examples of how the
modern courts have failed to sufficiently wield their power to protect
negative liberty. But that is a failure of modern statutory interpretation
doctrine, not a failure of the Madisonian separation of powers.
Epps anticipates this argument as the “typical response” of those
to whom he is responding—I am, after all “argu[ing] that the problem
is simply insufficient adherence to the separation of powers” and I am
specifically saying that the courts need to better understand and “more
rigorously enforce constitutional limits.” 75 In other words, I am
essentially the target audience for Epps’s separation of powers critique.
So what is Epps’s reply to the “typical response”? He criticizes it
because, in his view, “it fails to fully grapple with the fact that our
system of separated powers has in fact generated the very defects that
the critics bemoan.” 76 In other words, because the modern system came
about despite the Madisonian separation of powers, merely separating
powers cannot ensure the protection of liberty.
Indeed, Epps goes a step further to say that, when different
branches share the same interests—e.g., when the legislature and
prosecutors both want broader and harsher criminal laws—then we
should expect Madison’s prediction of ambition counteracting ambition
to fail. 77 He says that we should expect this failure because the same
political forces that lead the legislature and executive to favor broader
and harsher criminal laws will not spare judges. Judges are influenced
by politics, if not through direct elections by voters, than through the
72. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.7(d) (noting that the defense has “seldom been
. . . made the subject of legislation”).
73. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 406 (citing 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 142(a), at
121 (1984)).
74. See generally Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 68 (arguing that courts should use their
interpretive power to adopt more criminal law clear statement rules).
75. Epps, supra note 1, at 48.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 48–49.
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political appointment process. Thus, as Epps tells us, “expecting judges
to provide a meaningful check on the other branches because they are
part of ‘the judiciary’ is little more than magical thinking.” 78
Epps’s reply to the “typical response” leaves me quite
dissatisfied. First, the argument appears to be an example of hindsight
bias 79—the separation of powers failed to protect liberty in this
instance, so the argument goes, and that is proof it was destined to fail.
It is certainly true that we currently have a separation of powers
doctrine that does not sufficiently protect individual liberty in the
criminal justice system. 80 But that does not mean separating powers is
necessarily a bad way to protect liberty or that we should have expected
Madison’s plan to fail.
To the contrary, functionally separating powers seems to have
done a relatively decent job at protecting liberty for much of our
country’s history. It is only since the mid-twentieth century that the
Supreme Court endorsed plea bargaining 81 and began to defer to
prosecutorial decision making. 82 And the Court’s insistence that it
cannot (or should not) narrowly construe statutes is even more recent—
it is part of the Court’s embrace of textualism in the last thirty or so
years. 83 And, despite that embrace, the Court still manages to find
reasons to construe at least some statutes it does not like narrowly. 84
One recommended cure to hindsight bias is to encourage people
to imagine and describe how outcomes that did not happen could have
occurred. Apparently that exercise helps counteract the usual
inclination to discount information that suggests a different outcome
78. Id. at 49.
79. As Christopher Leslie has helpfully summarized:
The potential for hindsight bias exists when a person is tasked with determining the ex ante
probability of an event after the fact. If people learn that the event did not, in fact, occur, they are
more likely to believe that the before-the-fact probability of the event occurring was relatively low.
Conversely, if people learn that the event did later occur, they are more likely to say that the event
was highly probable—perhaps inevitable—all along. This phenomenon is hindsight bias: the
“using [of] known outcomes to assess the predictability at some earlier time of something that has
already happened.” Because of hindsight bias, “[p]eople overstate their own ability to have
predicted the past and believe that others should have been able to predict events better than was
possible.”
Christopher R. Leslie, Hindsight Bias in Antitrust Law, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1532–33 (2018).
80. See generally Barkow, supra note 33.
81. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
82. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 455–
56 (1962).
83. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin
Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303 (2017) (tracing the emergence and embrace of textualism to the
confirmation of Justice Antonin Scalia in 1986).
84. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844
(2014).

176

VANDERBILT L. REV. EN BANC

[Vol. 74:159

was equally possible, and it results in a more nuanced perspective of
the causal chain of events. 85
So please indulge me as I describe an outcome that could have
happened under the functional separation of powers—an outcome in
which plea bargaining did not come to dominate the criminal justice
system. If things had played out slightly differently, plea bargaining
would not have flourished, and much of the concentration of power in
the hands of prosecutors (and the breakdown of separation of powers
that it has wrought) would not have occurred.
Right now, plea bargaining dominates the criminal justice
system. More than ninety-five percent of the convictions in this country
are the result of plea bargains, 86 leading the Supreme Court to declare
that “plea bargains have become so central to the administration of the
criminal justice system” that plea bargaining “‘is not some adjunct to
the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.’” 87 Plea
bargaining empowers prosecutors, allowing them to circumvent juries
and, to a great extent, judges in securing convictions and selecting the
punishment in their own cases. 88 Put differently, plea bargaining has
largely given prosecutors the “judicial power” of conviction and
imposing sentence.
The present-day domination of plea bargaining obscures the fact
that plea bargaining is largely a modern phenomenon. 89 As Albert
Alschuler, 90 Will Ortman, 91 and others have documented, plea
bargaining was incredibly disfavored by the elite legal community
through at least the mid-1930s. When widespread plea bargaining was
85. See Neal Roese & Kathleen Vohs, Hindsight Bias, 7 PERSPS. PSYCH. SCI. 411 (2012).
86. NACDL, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF
EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT (2018) (“[O]ver the last fifty years, trial by jury has declined at
an ever-increasing rate to the point that this institution now occurs in less than 3% of state and
federal criminal cases.”).
87. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
88. Barkow, supra note 33, at 1047–50; Baughman, supra note 35, at 1083–84.
89. To be clear, we can find examples of plea bargaining that date back to the first half of the
nineteenth century. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 21–22 (2003). But the conventional wisdom is that plea bargaining
occurred in only a small fraction of cases until the late nineteenth century. See id. at 112–13;
LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870-1910, at 192–95 (1981) (noting that, although plea
bargaining was “well established” by 1890, the trend increased during the next three decades and
only began to dominate the system by the mid-twentieth century); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea
Bargaining and Its History, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 211, 223 (1979) (noting that, in New York, guilty
plea rates increased steadily during the mid- and late-nineteenth century).
90. See Alschuler, supra note 89, at 223–227 (explaining how appellate courts disfavored plea
bargaining in the early twentieth century).
91. See Ortman, supra note 61, at 1460–63 (describing judicial disdain toward plea bargains).
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uncovered in several surveys of local criminal justice systems, the
response was overwhelmingly negative. 92 For example, there was a call
to immediately remove three trial judges in Chicago, who were reported
to have allowed defendants to plead guilty in exchange for a reduction
of felony charges to misdemeanors. The trial judges were allowed to
keep their jobs only after a committee of appellate judges conducted an
inquiry and said that the prosecutors, and not the judges were to
blame. 93 Hostility to plea bargaining was quite common among
appellate court judges. Several state supreme courts held the practice
unconstitutional. 94 The U.S. Supreme Court expressed animosity
towards the practice in a few late-nineteenth cases, 95 but it did not have
the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the practice.
Let us imagine that those U.S. Supreme Court cases had played
out differently—that one of the three anti-plea bargaining cases had
squarely presented the question of plea bargaining’s constitutionality.
Because plea bargaining would have been prohibited, less of it would
have occurred. And, perhaps more importantly, to the extent it did
occur, it would happen in secret, rather than as an accepted feature of
the criminal justice system.
If less plea bargaining had occurred, or if plea bargaining had
only been occurring in secret, then the Supreme Court would have been
much less likely to have endorsed it in the 1970s. For one thing, the
Court tends to follow precedent, rather than overrule previous cases.
For another, the reasons that the Court gave in upholding the
constitutionality of plea bargaining would not have been as compelling.
The ubiquity of plea bargaining and its ability to allow the criminal
justice system to dispose of cases efficiently played a major role in the
Court’s decision to declare the practice constitutional in the 1970s. 96
But if plea bargaining had not been a widespread and open practice in
the 1970s, then the Court might have come out the other way. At a
minimum, the Court likely would have been willing to recognize serious
limits on the practice if there was a prior decision declaring the practice
unconstitutional.

92. Id. at 1455–63.
93. Alschuler, supra note 89, at 232; Ortman, supra note 61, at 1460–61.
94. See Alschuler, supra note 89, at 224–26 (collecting and describing cases).
95. Id. at 226–27 (describing The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878), Insurance Co. v. Morse,
87 U.S. 445 (1874), and Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892)).
96. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (noting that, without plea
bargaining, “the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities”); see also C.J. Warren Burger, State of the Judiciary 1970,
56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970) (describing, in dire economic terms, what would happen if even a small
number of defendants who pleaded guilty instead decided to insist on their right to a trial).
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While we can never know for certain how alternate facts would
have affected history, this counterfactual seems sufficiently plausible to
cast doubt on the inevitability of the modern dominance of plea
bargaining. If a slightly different mix of cases had made their way to
the U.S. Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, then plea
bargaining might have remained an unsanctioned and disfavored
practice in busy urban courts, rather than a ubiquitous practice that
has skewed the balance of power between the branches. And so it seems
unwarranted to assume that a system of functionally separated powers
would necessary have ended up concentrating power in the hands of the
executive.
In addition to assuming that ours is the only way that the
separation of powers could have played out, Epps is also too quick to
dismiss the idea that the judiciary will behave differently than the
political branches. 97 To be clear, there is reason to think that judicial
elections will result in some judges who are unwilling to be “soft on
crime.” There are examples of interests groups seeking to advance noncriminal law ends using state judges’ pro-criminal-defendant rulings in
attack ads. 98 But those same judicial election dynamics are not at play
in systems with life tenure for judges, and so there is reason to doubt
that those judges will cave to the same “tough on crime” politics with
which elected officials must contend.
Nor should we expect “tough on crime” politics to affect the
nominations and confirmations of judges the same way they affect
elections of legislators and executive officials. That is because the
separation of powers issues on which judges must rule do not neatly
map onto modern fights about political ideology and the courts. Judicial
confirmation fights are often framed in terms of constitutional
methodology, and tend to focus on issues like abortion, rather than on
questions of criminal law. As a result, a “tough on crime” president
might nominate a “constitutional conservative” who rules in favor of
criminal defendants on constitutional issues. Justice Gorsuch, for
example, has relied on the separation of powers to arrive at some
defense-friendly and liberty-protecting decisions. 99 Justice Scalia

97. Epps, supra note 1, at 40–41.
98. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 1–3 (2012) (collecting recent incidents); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts
at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 14 n.74 (1995) (collecting incidents from the 1980s and 1990s).
99. E.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018) (Gorsuch J, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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sometimes did the same. 100 More liberal Justices sometimes arrive at
similar outcomes for different reasons, which is why criminal justice
opinions can lead to strange bedfellows. 101
Moreover, I think that Professor Epps is too quick to dismiss the
idea that their professional identity as judges is relevant to the
decisions judges make. Ron Wright and Kay Levine have done
important work on the professional identity of prosecutors. 102 As they
explain, “professional identity is likely to change over time, particularly
for professionals who make career transitions that require them to
display new skills and attitudes.” 103 And there is a social science
literature documenting the effect of professionals’ role identity on their
decision-making. 104
In addition to how an individual judge views her professional
role identity (as compared to how an executive official views her role),
the judicial role itself comes with different formal rules. There are
constitutional guarantees about neutral decision-making that apply to
judges and that do not extend to the political branches. 105 There are also
ethics rules that limit the ability of judges to engage in political
activity. 106 That is not to say that politics play no role in the decisions
that judges make. But we talk about judges playing politics as
something that is not supposed to happen, while it is considered
business as usual in the other branches.
III. DIFFUSING POWER WITHIN BRANCHES
The influence of professional identity on decision-making is one
reason that I am skeptical of Professor Epps’s claim that diffusing
100. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. E.g., Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2282 (2016) (in which Justice Thomas’s
dissenting opinion was joined, in part, by Justice Sotomayor); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 625 (2004) (in which Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion was joined by Justice Ginsburg);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (in which Justice Steven’s majority opinion was joined
by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg).
102. See generally Ronald F. Wright & Kay Levine, Career Motivations of State Prosecutors,
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1667 (2018); Ronald F. Wright & Kay Levine, The Cure for Young
Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065 (2014); Ronald F. Wright & Kay Levine, Prosecution
in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (2012).
103. Wright & Levine, Prosecution in 3-D, supra note 102, at 1131–32.
104. See, e.g., Carina Schott, Trui Steen, & Daphne Van Kleef, The Combined Impact of
Professional Role Identity and Public Service Motivation on Decision-making in Dilemma
Situations, 84 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCIS. 21, 28 (2018) (finding that professional role identity affects
the decision-making of veterinary inspectors).
105. Compare Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), with Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238
(1980).
106. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020).
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power within a single branch can be an effective way to protect liberty.
Epps takes as his model the many administrative agencies that make
rules, prosecute rule breakers, and adjudicate those claims of rule
breaking. To the extent that Epps is endorsing a similar approach to
criminal prosecutions—an approach that would give this task to an
executive agency—then I have serious reservations about how well the
executive will protect liberty.
When people work for one “side” of a criminal prosecution, they
are less likely to make decisions that undercut their “side.” 107 This is
why some have argued against locating the clemency bureaucracy and
forensic science units within law enforcement agencies like the
Department of Justice. 108 When pardon attorneys and forensic
scientists work within law enforcement agencies, they view themselves
as being “on the same team” as police and prosecutors, even though they
are supposed to be making independent decisions, and that sense of
professional community appears to affect their judgments.
Also, as I mentioned at the end of the previous section, there is
reason to think that judges will—and do—respond differently to toughon-crime politics than do officials in the other branches. 109 Within the
political branches, it is seen as a virtue to be responsive to the general
public; but in the judiciary, public passions are not supposed to prevent
the judge from reaching the appropriate outcome in a particular case.
The different professional identities suggest that people will make
different decisions depending on the role that they occupy within
government.
Indeed, we have examples of people who changed their conduct
because their role—and thus their professional identity—shifted.
History buffs will no doubt think of Thomas Becket, who aided his ally
and close friend King Henry II in consolidating power for the Crown at
the expense of the Church until he became Archbishop of Canterbury,
radically changed his behavior, and supported the interests of the
Church against the English crown. 110 More recently—and more
107. E.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 792 (discussing the ways in which federal law enforcement agents and federal
prosecutors interact with each other and noting that “one ought not underestimate the unifying
influence of a shared commitment to ‘“getting the bad guys,’” hardened by the adversarial
process”).
108. See, e.g., SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, COPS IN LAB COATS: CURBING WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT FORENSIC LABORATORIES (2015); Rachel E. Barkow,
Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271
(2013).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101.
110. See, e.g., SIMON SCHAMA, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN: AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD? 125–34
(2000).
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relevantly—we have the example of Justice Sonia Sotomayor. She
worked as a prosecutor before becoming a judge, and yet she has proven
to be one of the staunchest defenders of the rights of criminal justice on
the U.S. Supreme Court. 111
My skepticism about the diffusion of power across executive
institutions is informed by my own research into the states. Unlike the
federal system, which concentrates the executive power over criminal
justice matters in the Department of Justice, most states have formally
diffused executive power across multiple institutions, some of which are
fully independent of one another. In those states, the decision to
prosecute a case involves multiple actors or institutions. 112 Police make
initial decisions about who to bring into the system. The ultimate
authority for that decision ordinarily lies with a sheriff, who is
independently elected, or a police chief is appointed by or answerable to
other locally elected officials. 113 Prosecutors decide whether to pursue a
prosecution. In forty-five states, the ultimate authority for that decision
lies with a locally elected prosecutor. 114 And in some states the Attorney
General or the Governor (also independently elected) have the power to
take cases away from local prosecutors. 115 Those three separate
institutions are making the same decision—whether to pursue a
conviction. When they do not agree, there is no conviction.
How does this diffusion of executive power serve the protection
of liberty? Not particularly well. The political pressure from other
executive officials seems to push decisionmakers to be more punitive.
When prosecutors have announced non-prosecution policies, for
example, those decisions have often been met with significant
resistance and criticism from law enforcement. 116 And when one Florida
prosecutor announced that she would use her discretion to no longer

111. Interestingly, Justice Samuel Alito also used to be a prosecutor, and he has proven to be
one of the most pro-prosecution voices on the Court. So the strength of influence of professional
identity likely varies from judge to judge.
112. Depending on the state, police may arrest and then the prosecutor may need to
independently file charges. But not all states follow this model.
113. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1831 (2015).
114. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537,
1548–57 (2020) (detailing how the states select their prosecutors).
115. See generally Tyler Q. Yeargain, Comment, Discretion Versus Supersession: Calibrating
the Power Balance Between Local Prosecutors and State Officials, 68 EMORY L.J. 95 (2018).
116. See, e.g., Tim Prudente, Baltimore Will Stop Prosecuting Marijuana Possession, Mosby
Announces, BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-mdmosby-marijuana-prosecution-policy-20190129-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9KY6-E285]
(detailing a situation where a prosecutor was isolated for adopting a non-prosecution policy for
marijuana-related charges).
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seek the death penalty, the state’s governor responded by removing all
death-penalty-eligible cases from her jurisdiction. 117
To be clear, diffusing executive power may possibly reduce the
number of people convicted. After all, prosecutors often decline to bring
charges even when the police have made arrests. 118 But it is also
possible that state prosecutors end up bringing charges in more cases
than they otherwise would have because they do not have the same
opportunities to shape (and narrow) investigations as they do in the
more consolidated Department of Justice. 119 Whether greater
consolidation in the states or more diffusion in the DOJ would increase
or decrease convictions is ultimately an empirical question that neither
Epps nor I can answer. But I will note that the states have done far
more to fuel mass incarceration than the federal government, even
though the states have diffused more power. 120
Professor Epps also argues that the functional separation of
powers may “dilute accountability” and thus make it more difficult for
voters to hold their elected officials accountable for polices or outcomes
that they do not like. 121 In contrast, if a single agency is performing all
of the functions, then that agency could theoretically be held
responsible for any outcome that is disfavored.
It is certainly true that legislators can blame prosecutors for
unpopular prosecutions, while prosecutors can say that they are merely
following the laws that the legislature passed. 122 But such shirking of
responsibility is hardly unique to the functional separation of powers.
The two major political parties, for example, routinely blame one
another for the failure to pass legislation.
In any event, when voters care enough about a particular issue,
they seem quite capable of holding multiple branches and officials
responsible. For example, when voters in Harris County, Texas were
dissatisfied with the county’s abusive bail practices, they elected a new
sheriff, new judges, and new country commissioners—all of whom
supported bail reform. The newly elected officials changed bail practices

117. Matt Dixon, Scott Wins Death Penalty Dispute with Soros-backed State Attorney,
POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/08/31/rick-scott-winsdeath-penalty-dispute-with-soros-backed-state-attorney-114240 [https://perma.cc/J8U7-SH6G].
118. PFAFF, supra note 19, at 129–31.
119. See Richman, supra note 107, at 782–83 (discussing the extent to which federal law
enforcement will sometimes seek federal prosecutors’ counsel and advice in their investigation
tactics and actions).
120. PFAFF, supra note 19, at 13–16 (explaining that state and local decisions have a much
larger impact on mass incarceration than federal decisions).
121. Epps, supra note 1, at 41.
122. Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 68, at 354 n.7 (collecting sources).
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and settled a civil rights law suit that previous officials had spent
millions of dollars fighting. 123
Of course, Professor Epps offers far more in the way of suggested
reforms than merely diffusing power within single institutions or
branches. He offers a number of different ways of checking
decisionmakers in the criminal justice system. Some of them, like giving
more voice to non-state actors, seem like good ideas, and we should
probably consider adopting them.
But adopting those suggestions would not require us to reorient
the conversation away from Madisonian separation of powers. They
could simply be adopted on their own terms.
*******
As a general matter, I have no objection to the idea that there
should be more checks and balances in the criminal justice system. In
fact, like Professor Epps, I think that the idea of checks and balances
has sometimes gotten short shrift in our conversations about the
separation of powers. But I diagnose the problem somewhat differently
than Professor Epps. He thinks that we should prioritize checks and
balances and resign ourselves to the fact that the functional separation
of powers was never going to give us the negative liberty protections
that we have so long assumed that they would. For my part, I think that
the conversation about functional separation of powers has been led
astray. We have allowed modern conventions (and preferences) to warp
our views of which powers each of the branches is supposed to possess.
In particular, we continue to assume that the “judicial power” gave very
limited authority to judges and juries and that the “executive power”
gave great authority to the executive.
But that is simply not what the people who wrote the
Constitution intended. They thought that judges and juries would play
a very significant role in the criminal law—that they would have powers
that overlapped and thus could check the powers of the legislature and
the executive. Thus, I do not think that we need to reject Madisonian
separation of powers, because it “confin[es] each decisionmaker in the
system to one narrowly defined role,” and replace it with a new system

123. Michael Barajas, ‘A Watershed Moment’ for Bail Reform in Harris County, TEX.
OBSERVER (July 31, 2019), https://www.texasobserver.org/a-watershed-moment-for-bail-reformin-harris-county/ [https://perma.cc/XG77-NZD9]; Florian Martin, Ed Gonzalez Wins Harris County
PUB.
MEDIA
(Nov.
8,
2016),
Sheriff’s
Race,
HOUS.
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2016/11/08/176835/ed-gonzalez-will-be-thenext-sheriff-of-harris-county/ [https://perma.cc/4WM9-JXJT].
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in which decisionmakers “have some overlapping jurisdiction.” 124 We do
not need to reject Madisonian separation of powers because Madison
did not actually design a system with “narrowly defined roles”—instead
he designed a system in which the courts already had “overlapping
jurisdiction” with both the legislature and the executive.
When the Constitution was written, federal judges possessed the
power to recognize common law crimes. 125 And although that power
became a casualty of the early partisan battles between the Federalists
and Democratic Republicans, 126 this key feature of the judicial role
persisted in the states for a long time after—and in some states it
continues to this day. 127 The power to recognize non-statutory
affirmative defenses is alive and well in both the federal and state
courts. 128 Those powers are not consistent with the “judicial
minimalism” that we hear about in modern Supreme Court
confirmation hearings—they sound too much like judges “making
policy,” “acting as legislators,” or whatever else nominees say to
reassure Senators that they won’t do things that sound like “judicial
activism.” But the history on this point is quite clear—judges had
significant authority over the content of the criminal law—and that
authority was thought to be part of the “judicial power.” 129
A similar story can be told about juries and nullification—a story
about how American juries were supposed to act as a bulwark against
tyranny by refusing to convict if they thought punishment was not
warranted. Others have told that story in great detail, 130 and so I will
not repeat it here. Instead I will simply note that the nullification power
quite clearly overlaps with a prosecutor’s declination power—both have
124. See Epps, supra note 1, at 70.
125. See generally Hessick, supra note 9 (detailing this power); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal
Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1985) (overviewing the history of federal common
law).
126. Federalist judges used their common law authority to convict Republicans in federal
courts, and, as a result, federal criminal common law authority became inextricably bound up with
those partisan positions. See Jay, supra note 125, at 1112, 1030, 1075.
127. Hessick, supra note 9, at 979–83.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
129. Hessick, supra note 9, at 1008–13.
130. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 66; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law,
52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111 (1999); Harris G.
Mirkin, Judicial Review, Jury Review & the Right of Revolution Against Despotism, 6 POLITY 38
(1973); John T. Reed, Comment, Penn, Zenger and O.J.: Jury Nullification-Justice or the “Wacko
Fringe’s” Attempt to Further Its Anti-Government Agenda?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1125 (1996); Phillip B.
Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389
(1988); Robert J. Stolt, Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 NEW ENG. L. REV. 105
(1971); Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales
for Jury Nullification After Bushell’s Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815 (2002).
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the authority to refuse to punish even when the defendant’s behavior
fell within the relevant criminal law.
In sum, I agree with Professor Epps that we should talk more
about checks and balances. Where we disagree is what role separation
of powers ought to play in that conversation. He views the functional
separation of powers as something relatively distinct from checks and
balances—sometimes the functional separation of powers will result in
checks and balances, but it is generally not up to the task of preserving
liberty. In contrast, I think that, when the powers are appropriately
defined, the separation of powers is itself a great source of checks and
balances in the criminal justice system, and it continues to help protect
against punishment by creating veto gates.
Rather than abandoning the functional separation of powers to
pursue new methods of diffusing power, I think that we can restore a
number of checks and balances to the system by rejecting the modern,
narrow view of the judicial power. Judges previously used their powers
to narrowly construe criminal laws adopted by legislature, and juries
previously used their power to prevent unjust prosecutions by the
executive. We should do what we can to facilitate a return to that
system, including convincing those judges who style themselves
originalists that they have failed to appreciate the original
understanding of the judicial power.
Finally, we need to recognize that there is only so much that
structure will do to cabin the perennial desire to inflict punishment on
people who commit crimes. Structural arrangements provide only a
blunt tool; they will not prevent all unjust deprivations of liberty. And
reorienting the discussion within the criminal law community away
from the idea that the separation of powers is meant to protect liberty,
towards the idea that it is sometimes supposed to facilitate more
prosecutions and convictions, is not a step in the right direction.

